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High-dimensional quantum key distribution (HDQKD) offers the possibility of high secure-key
rate with high photon-information efficiency. We consider HDQKD based on the time-energy en-
tanglement produced by spontaneous parametric downconversion, and show that it is secure against
collective attacks. Its security rests upon visibility data—obtained from Franson and conjugate-
Franson interferometers—that probe photon-pair frequency correlations and arrival-time correla-
tions. From these measurements an upper bound can be established on the eavesdropper’s Holevo
information by translating the Gaussian-state security analysis for continuous-variable quantum key
distribution so that it applies to our protocol. We show that visibility data from just the Franson
interferometer provides a weaker, but nonetheless useful, secure-key rate lower bound. To handle
multiple-pair emissions, we incorporate the decoy-state approach into our protocol. Our results
show that over 200 km transmission distance in optical fiber, time-energy entanglement HDQKD
could permit a 700 bit/sec secure-key rate, and a photon information efficiency of 2 secure-key bits
per photon coincidence in the key-generation phase using receivers with 15% system efficiency.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 42.50.Dv, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] promises un-
conditionally secure communication by enabling one-
time pad transmission between remote parties, Alice and
Bob. Continuous-variable QKD (CVQKD) [2, 3] and
discrete-variable QKD (DVQKD) [4, 5] utilize infinite-
dimensional and finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, re-
spectively. CVQKD exploits the wave nature of light
to encode multiple bits into each transmission, but it has
been limited to 80 km in optical fiber [3, 6, 7] because
the eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain partial information
from a beam-splitting attack. The predominant DVQKD
protocol is Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84), which uses a
two-dimensional Hilbert space. Decoy-state BB84 [8, 9]
has demonstrated nonzero secure-key rates over 144km
in free space [10] and 107km in optical fiber [11], but
its photon information efficiency cannot exceed 1 key-
bit/sifted-photon.
High-dimensional QKD (HDQKD) using single pho-
tons [12] can utilize the best features of the continuous
and discrete worlds, with the Hilbert space of single-
photon arrival times providing an appealing candidate
for its implementation. The time-energy entanglement of
photon pairs produced by spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) has been employed in HDQKD ex-
periments [13, 14], although these works lacked rigorous
security proofs. Security proofs for time-energy entan-
gled HDQKD have been attempted by discretizing the
continuous Hilbert space to permit use of DVQKD secu-
rity analyses [12, 15], but the validity of the discretiza-
tion approach has not been proven. CVQKD security
analysis [16, 17] uses the quadrature-component covari-
ance matrix to derive a lower bound on the secure-key
rate in the presence of a collective attack. We shall take
an analogous approach—using the time-frequency covari-
ance matrix (TFCM)—for our time-energy entanglement
HDQKD protocol.
The TFCM for our protocol can be obtained using
the dispersive-optics scheme from [18], although dense
wavelength-division multiplexing may be required to do
so [19]. An experimentally simpler technique—utilizing
a Franson interferometer—has been conjectured [13, 14]
to be sufficient for security verification. Its robust-
ness against some specific attacks has been discussed
[14, 20], but security against collective attacks has not
been proven, and [20] suggests such a proof may be im-
possible.
This Letter proves that time-energy entanglement
HDQKD can be made secure against Eve’s collective
attack when a Franson interferometer is used for se-
curity verification in conjunction with a dispersion-
based frequency-difference measurement. Our proof re-
lates the Franson interferometer’s fringe visibility to
the TFCM’s frequency elements that, together with
the frequency-difference measurement, establishes an up-
per bound on Eve’s Holevo information. We intro-
duce another nonlocal interferometer—the conjugate-
Franson interferometer—and link its fringe visibility to
the TFCM’s arrival-time elements [21]. Employing both
interferometers increases the secure-key rate.
Our fringe visibility results presume that the entan-
glement source emits at most one photon-pair in a mea-
surement frame, which need not be the case for SPDC.
Thus we incorporate decoy-state operation [8, 9] to han-
dle multiple-pair emissions. We will show that time-
energy entanglement HDQKD could permit a 700 bit/sec
secure-key rate over 200 km transmission distance in op-
tical fiber. We will also show that a photon information
efficiency of 2 secure-key bits per photon coincidence can
2be achieved in the key-generation phase using receivers
with 15% system efficiency. Before beginning our security
analysis, we provide a brief explanation of our protocol.
Suppose Alice has a repetitively-pumped, frequency-
degenerate SPDC source that, within a time frame of
duration Tf sec which is centered at time tm = 3mTf ,
emits a single photon-pair in the state [22]
|ψm〉SI ∝∫
dtS
∫
dtI e
−(t+−tm)
2/4σ2coh−t
2
−
/4σ2cor−iωP t+ |tS〉S |tI〉I(1)
for some integer m. In this expression: ωP is the pump
frequency; |tS〉S (|tI〉I) represents a single photon of
the signal (idler) at time tS (tI); t+ ≡ (tS + tI)/2;
t− ≡ tS − tI ; the root-mean-square coherence time
σcoh = Tf/
√
8 ln(2) ∼ ns is set by the pump pulse’s du-
ration; and the root-mean square correlation time σcor =√
2 ln(2)/2πBPM ∼ps is set by the reciprocal of the full-
width at half-maximum (FWHM) phase-matching band-
width, BPM, in Hz. Now suppose that, despite propa-
gation losses and detector inefficiencies, Alice and Bob
detect the signal and idler, respectively, from the preced-
ing photon pair and record the associated arrival times
[4, 5]. After many such frames, they use public com-
munication to reconcile their arrival-time data, resulting
in their sharing nR random bits per post-selected frame,
i.e., frames used for key generation in which Alice and
Bob both made detections. How many of those bits are
secure against Eve’s collective attack? Before turning
to the security analysis, we pause for a brief note about
Eq. (1). This expression is an oft-used approximation for
the post-selected biphoton state produced by an SPDC
source, see, e.g., [14]. Moreover, entanglement engineer-
ing can be employed to achieve a close match to a truly
Gaussian biphoton wave function [25].
Our security analysis begins with the positive-
frequency field operators, EˆS(t) and EˆI(t), for the
linearly-polarized single spatial-mode signal and idler
fields emitted by Alice’s source, and their associated fre-
quency decompositions:
EˆS(t) =
∫
dω
2π
AˆS(ω)e
−i(ωP /2+ω)t (2a)
EˆI(t) =
∫
dω
2π
AˆI(ω)e
−i(ωP /2−ω)t. (2b)
The time-domain field operators EˆS(t) and EˆI(t) an-
nihilate signal and idler photons, respectively, at time
t, and they obey the canonical commutation relations,
[EˆJ (t), Eˆ
†
K(u)] = δJKδ(t − u), for J,K = S, I. Their
frequency-domain counterparts, AˆS(ω) and AˆI(ω), anni-
hilate signal and idler photons at detunings ω and −ω,
respectively. Our interest, however, is in the arrival-time
and angular-frequency operators,
tˆJ =
∫
dt tEˆ†J (t)EˆJ (t), (3a)
ωˆJ =
∫
dω
2π
ωAˆ†J(ω)AˆJ (ω), (3b)
for J = S, I, when only one photon-pair is emitted by
the source. Restricting these time and frequency oper-
ators to the single-pair Hilbert space implies that they
measure the arrival times and frequency detunings of the
signal and idler photons. It also leads to the commuta-
tion relation [ωˆJ , tˆK ] = iǫJδJK [26], where ǫS = −ǫI = 1,
making these operators conjugate observables analogous
to the quadrature components employed in CVQKD, and
justifying our translating CVQKD’s covariance-based se-
curity analysis [16, 17] to our protocol.
To exploit the connection to CVQKD, we define an ob-
servable vector Oˆ = [ tˆS ωˆS tˆI ωˆI ]
T . For a single-pair
state, the mean value of Oˆ ism = 〈Oˆ〉, and the TFCM is
Γ = 〈(∆Oˆ∆Oˆ†+h.c.)〉/2, where ∆Oˆ ≡ Oˆ−m and h.c.
denotes Hermitian conjugate. The characteristic function
associated with the single-pair state is χ(ζ) = 〈eiζT Oˆ〉.
Given the covariance matrix Γ, the Gaussian state with
χ(ζ) = eiζ
T
m−ζTΓζ/2 yields an m-independent upper
bound on Eve’s Holevo information [16, 17, 27] when the
SPDC source emits a single-pair state.
FIG. 1: (color online) Top panel: diagram for the Franson
interferometer. Bottom panel: diagram for the conjugate-
Franson interferometer. PM: phase modulator; OFS: optical-
frequency shifter; Disp+: positive dispersion element; Disp−:
negative dispersion element. D: detector.
A direct, complete measurement of the TFCM is quite
challenging, so we will resort to indirect measurements—
using a Franson interferometer and a conjugate-Franson
interferometer—that provide useful partial information.
A Franson interferometer [28], shown in the top panel of
Fig. 1, consists of two unequal path-length Mach-Zehnder
interferometers, with the signal going through one and
the idler going through the other. The time delay ∆T be-
tween each Mach-Zehnder’s long and short paths is much
greater than the correlation time σcor, ruling out local
interference in the individual interferometers. It is also
greater than the FWHM detector timing jitter, δT , so
that coincidences are only registered when both photons
3go through the long or the short path. Each long path is
equipped with a phase modulator, imparting phase shifts
e−iφS and e−iφI to the signal and the idler respectively.
The following Lemma shows that Franson measurements,
augmented by dispersion-based frequency measurements,
bound the signal-idler frequency correlations [26]:
Lemma 1: For a single-pair state let VFI(∆T ) =
[PCFI(0)−PCFI(π)]/[PCFI(0)+PCFI(π)], where PCFI(φS+
φI) is Alice and Bob’s coincidence probability, be the 0-π
fringe visibility when the Franson interferometer has de-
lay ∆T . Then the variance of the signal-idler frequency
difference satisfies〈
(∆ωˆS −∆ωˆI)2
〉 ≤ 2[1− VFI(∆T )]
∆T 2
+
〈(ω˜S − ω˜I)4〉
12
∆T 2,
(4)
where ω˜S (ω˜I) is the random variable associated with
the measured signal (idler) angular frequency from the
conjugate-Franson interferometer with its frequency-
shifted arms disabled, i.e., when dispersion enables fre-
quency correlations to be measured from arrival-time co-
incidences.
A conjugate-Franson interferometer, shown in the bot-
tom panel of Fig. 1, consists of two equal path-length
Mach-Zehnders with one arm of each containing an
electro-optic optical-frequency shifter. To rule out local
interference, these devices shift the signal and idler fre-
quencies by−∆Ω and ∆Ω, respectively, while phase mod-
ulators (not shown) apply phase shifts e−iφS and e−iφI ,
as was done in the Franson interferometer. The pos-
itive and negative dispersion elements have coefficients
±β2 satisfying β2∆Ω =
√
2Tg > δT , where Tg is the
duration of detectors’ coincidence gate [6]. They time-
disperse the signal and idler’s frequency components so
that two detectors suffice to measure their frequency co-
incidences [18, 26]. The following Lemma shows that
conjugate-Franson measurements, augmented by arrival-
time measurements, bound the signal-idler arrival-time
correlations [26]:
Lemma 2: For a single-pair state let VCFI(∆Ω) =
[PCCFI(0) − PCCFI(π)]/[PCCFI(0) + PCCFI(π)], where
PCCFI(φS+φI) is Alice and Bob’s coincidence probability,
be the 0-π fringe visibility when the conjugate-Franson
interferometer has frequency shift ∆Ω. Then the vari-
ance of the signal-idler arrival-time difference satisfies
〈
(∆tˆS −∆tˆI)2
〉 ≤ 2[1− VCFI(∆Ω)]
∆Ω2
+
〈(t˜S − t˜I)4〉
12
∆Ω2,
(5)
where t˜S (t˜I) is the random variable associated with the
measured signal (idler) arrival time from the Franson in-
terferometer with its long arms disabled.
Lemmas 1 and 2 will be used below to bound Eve’s
Holevo information for a frame in which Alice’s source
emits a single photon-pair. Because there is no security
assurance for multiple-pair emissions, we follow the lead
of DVQKD by employing decoy states [8, 9] to deal with
this problem. In particular, Alice operates her SPDC
source at several different pump powers enabling Bob and
her to estimate the fraction, F , of their coincidences that
originated from single-pair emissions [7].
To put an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information,
we start from the following points: (1) Symmetry dic-
tates that only 10 TFCM elements need to be found.
Of these, 〈∆ωˆ2S〉 and 〈∆tˆ2S〉 are immune to Eve’s attack
because Eve does not have access to Alice’s apparatus,
which contains the SPDC source. (2) Given the Fran-
son and conjugate-Franson’s fringe visibilities, making
〈∆tˆJ∆ωˆK〉 6= 0, for J,K = S, I, does not increase Eve’s
Holevo information [26]. (3) From Lemmas 1 and 2 we
can determine upper bounds on the excess noise factors
1+ ξω ≡ 〈(∆ωˆS−∆ωˆI)2〉/〈(∆ωˆS0−∆ωˆI0)2〉 and 1+ ξt ≡
〈(∆tˆS−∆tˆI)2〉/〈(∆tˆS0−∆tˆI0)2〉, where 〈(∆tˆS0−∆tˆI0)2〉
and 〈(∆ωˆS0 −∆ωˆI0)2〉 are the source’s variances as mea-
sured by Alice during her source-characterization phase.
Points (1)-(3) specify a set, M, of physically allowed
TFCMs that preserve the Heisenberg uncertainty re-
lations for the elements of Oˆ which are implied by
[ωˆJ , tˆK ] = iǫJδJK . For each TFCM Γ ∈ M, the
Gaussian state χ(ζ) = e−ζ
T
Γζ/2 affords Eve the maxi-
mum Holevo information [16, 17, 27]. Using χΓ(A;E)
to denote that Holevo information, our partial informa-
tion about Γ gives us the upper bound χUBξt,ξω(A;E) =
sup
Γ∈M[χΓ(A;E)] on what Eve can learn from a col-
lective attack on a single-pair frame. Thus Alice and
Bob’s secure-key rate (in bits/sec) has the lower bound
[9, 26, 31]
SKR ≥ qpr
3Tf
[
βI(A;B)−(1−F )nR−FχUBξt,ξω (A;E)
]
. (6)
Here: q is the fraction of the frames used for key genera-
tion (as opposed to Franson or conjugate-Franson oper-
ation or decoy-state transmission for parameter estima-
tion); pr is the probability of registering a coincidence in
a frame; β is the reconciliation efficiency; and I(A;B) is
Alice and Bob’s Shannon information.
Figure 2’s left panel plots Alice and Bob’s secure-
key rate (SKR) versus transmission distance for two
frame durations and two system efficiencies for Alice
(ηA) and Bob’s (ηB) receivers, which use superconduct-
ing nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs). To cal-
culate the ξω’s we assume that the measured VFI val-
ues are their ideal values—93.25% for Tf = 16 δT and
98.27% for Tf = 32 δT—multiplied by 0.995. (These VFI
values are achievable, see [32] in which 99.6% fringe vis-
ibility was reported.) For the red and blue curves, we
calculate the ξt’s by assuming that the measured VCFI’s
are their ideal values—99.96% for both Tf = 16 δT and
Tf = 32 δT—multiplied by 0.995. For the black curve, ξt
represents jitter-limited raw arrival-time measurements.
We see that QKD is possible out to 200km when Alice
and Bob have receivers with 15% system efficiency. Go-
ing to 90% system efficiency allows QKD out to 300km
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FIG. 2: Left panel: Alice and Bob’s secure-key rate ver-
sus transmission distance. Right panel: Alice and Bob’s
photon information efficiency versus transmission distance.
Both assume the following values. Entangled-pair flux:
0.01 pairs/frame; detector timing jitter δT = 30ps; BPM =
200GHz; ∆T/
√
2 = Tg = 3.6 δT ; ∆Ω/2π = 5GHz; β2∆Ω =√
2Tg; q = 0.5; β = 0.9; nR = 8; dark-count rate = 10
3/sec;
and fiber loss = 0.2 dB/km. Solid curves: Tf = 16 δT and
ξω = 0.22. Dashed curves: Tf = 32 δT and ξω = 1.01.
Blue curves: ηA = ηB = 15%. Red and black curves:
ηA = ηB = 90%. Red and blue curves: ξt = 41.5. Black
curves: ξt = 400.
and increases the secure-key rate by nearly two orders of
magnitude.
There is an important point to make about the secure-
key rate curves associated with the two ξt values we have
employed. Constraining Eve to ξt = 41.5 requires the
use of a conjugate-Franson interferometer, because jitter-
limited raw arrival-time measurements cannot measure
finer than ξt = 400 with our system parameters. Sur-
prisingly, ξt = 400 still yields a positive secure-key rate.
This is because eavesdropping in one basis disturbs corre-
lation in the conjugate basis. In our protocol, Alice and
Bob generate key from the time basis, so degradation in
the timing correlation does not increase Eve’s Holevo in-
formation, although it slightly reduces Alice and Bob’s
mutual information and hence their secure-key rate.
The photon information efficiency (PIE) is defined to
be the number of secure-key bits per photon coincidence
in the key-generation phase, PIE = SKR3Tf/qpr. The
right panel of Fig. 2 plots photon information efficiency
versus transmission distance. It shows that Alice and
Bob achieve PIE ≥ 2 secure-bits/coincidence in the key-
generation phase out to 200 km when their receivers have
15% system efficiency.
Our protocol sacrifices potential secure-key rate when
detector timing jitter, δT , exceeds the SPDC source’s
correlation time, σcor, i.e., I(A;B) cannot approach its
ultimate limit of log2(σcoh/σcor) bits/coincidence that
is set by the source’s Schmidt number. That limit
can be achieved with wavelength-division multiplexing
(WDM) that makes the two-photon correlation time in
each WDM channel comparable to the detector timing
jitter [19] and deriving key from time-frequency coinci-
dences. In this case, the conjugate-Franson interferome-
ter becomes crucial, because part of the secure key infor-
mation is obtained by frequency measurements. Nev-
ertheless, the TFCM is still sufficient to bound Eve’s
Holevo information.
Before concluding, it behooves us to compare our se-
curity predictions with the individual-attack results re-
ported in Brougham et al . [20]. The comparison is not
entirely straightforward, because those authors consid-
ered a time-binned version of time-energy entanglement
HDQKD with no multiple-pair emissions or dark counts,
whereas our protocol operates in continuous time and
includes both of those effects. Consider the 1024-bin ex-
ample from [20], in which Eve obtains 6 bits out of 10
when the Franson’s fringe visibility is 99.2% and 5bits
when that visibility is 99.8%. To compare our results
with those, we set Tf = 1024
√
2 δT , so that Alice and
Bob’s mutual information equals 10 bits/coincidence in
the presence of δT timing jitter when there are neither
dark counts nor multiple-pair emissions. Under these
conditions, our security analysis sets upper bounds of
6.07bits and 5.83 bits on Eve’s Holevo information for
99.2% and 99.8% FI visibility.
In summary, we adapted the Gaussian-state security
analysis for CVQKD to our time-energy entanglement
HDQKD protocol. We showed that a Franson interfer-
ometer’s fringe visibility suffices against arbitrary collec-
tive attacks when that measurement is used in conjunc-
tion with decoy states, which allow the fraction of single-
pair SPDC frames to be estimated. Adding a conjugate-
Franson interferometer to the system enables tighter con-
straints on the TFCM, leading to a higher secure-key
rate. Our protocol promises QKD over 200 km and mul-
tiple secure bits per coincidence.
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Supplemental Material
QUASIMONOCHROMATIC SIGNAL AND IDLER FIELD OPERATORS
We have taken the positive-frequency field operators EˆS(t) and EˆI(t) for the signal and idler outputs of Alice’s
spontaneous parametric downconverter to be quasimonochromatic, photon-units operators [1–3]. As such this gives
them the delta-function commutator, [EˆJ(t), Eˆ
†
K(u)] = δJKδ(t − u), for J,K = S, I. Our security proof relies on
time and frequency operators whose own delta-function commutator, proved in the next section, depends on the
quasimonochromatic condition’s validity. The 200GHz phase-matching bandwidth assumed in the main text’s system
example corresponds to 0.1% fractional bandwidth at the 1.55µm fiber telecom wavelength. Thus we are justified in
assuming that our field operators obey the quasimonochromatic condition.
PROOF OF [ωˆJ , tˆK ] = iǫJδJK FOR J,K = S, I
The operators for arrival-time and frequency-detuning measurements of the signal (J = S) and idler (J = I) are
defined as follows
tˆJ =
∫
dt tEˆ†J (t)EˆJ (t) (7a)
ωˆJ =
∫
dω
2π
ωAˆ†J(ω)AˆJ (ω), (7b)
where the field operators are restricted to the Hilbert space spanned by the vacuum state and the single-photon
time-domain states { |t〉J : −∞ < t <∞}, or, equivalently, the vacuum state and the single-photon frequency-domain
6states { |ω〉J : −∞ < ω <∞} [4]. In this Hilbert space the field operators reduce to
EˆJ(t) = |0〉JJ〈t|, (8)
and
AˆJ (ω) = |0〉JJ 〈ω|. (9)
With the preceding restricted expressions for the field operators in time and frequency, we can easily derive the
commutation relation [ωˆJ , tˆK ] = iǫJδJK for J,K = S, I. For J 6= K, the frequency-time commutator vanishes because
EˆJ (t) commutes with EˆK(t) and Eˆ
†
K(t) and hence so too does EˆJ (t) with AˆK(ω) and Aˆ
†
K(ω). For J = K = S we
have that
ωˆS tˆS − tˆSωˆS =
∫
dt
∫
dω
2π
ωt[(S〈ω|t〉S)|ω〉SS〈t| − (S〈t|ω〉S)|t〉SS〈ω|] (10)
=
∫
dt
∫
dω
2π
ωt[eiωt|ω〉SS〈t| − e−iωt|t〉SS〈ω|], (11)
where the second equality follows from
|ω〉S =
∫
dt e−iωt|t〉S (12)
and
S〈t1|t2〉S = δ(t1 − t2). (13)
Using Eqs. (11) and (13), we then obtain the time-domain matrix elements
S〈t1|[ωˆS , tˆS ]|t2〉S = (t2 − t1)
∫
dω
2π
ωe−iω(t1−t2). (14)
Now, let f(τ) be any square-integrable function on −∞ < τ < ∞ that is continuous at τ = 0, and has Fourier
transform
F (ω) =
∫
dτ f(τ)e−iωτ . (15)
We then have that
−
∫
dτ
∫
dω
2π
f(τ)τωe−iωτ = −i
∫
dω
2π
ω
dF (ω)
dω
= −i ω
2π
F (ω)|∞−∞ + i
∫
dω
2π
F (ω) = i
∫
dω
2π
F (ω) = if(0), (16)
where the first equality is a Fourier-transform property, the second uses integration by parts, the third results from
f(τ)’s being square-integrable, and the fourth by inverse Fourier transformation. Applying this result to Eq. (14)
yields
S〈t1|[ωˆS , tˆS ]|t2〉S = iδ(t1 − t2), (17)
which is equivalent to [ωˆS , tˆS ] = i, thus completing our proof for J = K = S. For J = K = I the proof follows the
same steps using
|ω〉I =
∫
dt eiωt|t〉I (18)
instead of Eq. (12).
7PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The coincidence probability for our Franson interferometer when only a single photon-pair has been emitted by
Alice’s source is [5]
PCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
〈[
Eˆ†S(t) + e
iφS Eˆ†S(t−∆T )
] [
Eˆ†I (u) + e
iφI Eˆ†I (u−∆T )
]
×
[
EˆS(t) + e
−iφS EˆS(t−∆T )
] [
EˆI(u) + e
−iφI EˆI(u −∆T )
]〉
, (19)
where η accounts for propagation losses [6] and detection efficiencies, and Tg > δT , with δT being the detectors’
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) timing jitter, is the duration of the coincidence gate. Because only a single
photon-pair has been emitted, we can employ Eq. (8) and rewrite the coincidence probability as
PCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
〈[|t〉SS〈0|+ eiφS |t−∆T 〉SS〈0|] [|u〉II〈0|+ eiφI |u−∆T 〉II〈0|]
× [|0〉SS〈t|+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈t−∆T |] [|0〉II〈u|+ e−iφI |0〉II〈u−∆T |]〉 . (20)
Multiplying out the bracketed expressions inside the averaging leads to a sum of sixteen terms, but only four of them
make nonzero contributions when ∆T > Tg > δT ≫ σcor. To see that this is so, let us first take the undisturbed (no
eavesdropping) biphoton wave function [7]
ψSI(tS , tI) =
e−(tS+tI)
2/16σ2coh−(tS−tI)
2/4σ2cor−iωP (tS+tI )/2√
2πσcohσcor
. (21)
Averaging a term from Eq. (20) that contains |tA〉SS〈tB| ⊗ |uA〉II〈uB| yields a result that contains
ψ∗SI(tA, uA)ψSI(tB , uB). Thus, unless |tA − uA| ≤ Tg/2 and |tB − uB| ≤ Tg/2, this term will make a negligible
contribution to PCFI . Indeed, the magnitude of each of these noncontributor terms is at least exp(−∆T 2/8σ2cor)
times smaller than the terms we will retain. For our paper’s system example, which assumes ∆T = 152.7ps and
σcor = 0.937ps, this attenuation factor is exp(−3320). These numbers apply to detectors without timing jitter. With
timing jitter, the preceding attenuation factor becomes exp(−∆T 2 ln(2)/2δT 2), which, because δT = 30 ps in our
system example, equals exp(−8.98). Now suppose there is eavesdropping. Then, unless Eve’s intrusion makes the
root-mean-square arrival-time difference exceed the coincidence gate, such terms will still fail to contribute to the
coincidence probability. An Eve who makes that strong a disturbance will easily be detected and accounted for during
reconciliation, so we will neglect that possibility in what follows, as we evaluate the coincidence probability.
After eliminating the twelve noncontributors to PCFI , we get
PCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
〈[
|t〉S |u〉II〈u|S〈t|+ e−i(φS+φI )|t〉S |u〉II〈u−∆T |S〈t−∆T |
+ ei(φS+φI)|t−∆T 〉S |u−∆T 〉II〈u|S〈t|+ |t−∆T 〉S |u−∆T 〉II〈u −∆T |S〈t−∆T |
]〉
. (22)
At this point the integration limits for u can be extended to −∞ < u < ∞, because the integrand vanishes for
|t− u| > Tg/2 by an argument similar to what we just gave to go from Eq. (20) to Eq. (22). Thus, we can write
PCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫
du
〈[
|t〉S |u〉II〈u|S〈t|+ e−i(φS+φI)|t〉S |u〉II〈u−∆T |S〈t−∆T |
+ ei(φS+φI )|t−∆T 〉S |u−∆T 〉II〈u|S〈t|+ |t−∆T 〉S|u−∆T 〉II〈u−∆T |S〈t−∆T |
]〉
. (23)
=
η
16
∫
dt
∫
du
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
∫
dω′S
2π
∫
dω′I
2π
ei[(ωS−ω
′
S)t−(ωI−ω
′
I)u]
[
1 + e−i[(φS+φI)−(ω
′
S−ω
′
I)∆T ]
+ ei[(φS+φI)−(ωS−ωI)∆T ] + e−i(ωS−ωI+ω
′
I−ω
′
S)∆T
]
〈|ωS〉S |ωI〉I I〈ω′I |S〈ω′S |〉 (24)
=
η
8
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
[
1 + Re
(
ei[(φS+φI )−(ωS−ωI)∆T ]
)]
〈|ωS〉S |ωI〉II〈ωI |S〈ωS |〉 (25)
=
η
8
[
1 + Re
(
ei(φS+φI )
〈
e−i(ωˆS−ωˆI)∆T
〉)]
, (26)
8where the second equality follows from Eqs. (12) and (18), and the last equality follows from the source’s emitting
a single photon-pair. Because the coincidence probability only depends on φ ≡ φS + φI , we shall use the notation
PCFI(φ) in what follows.
The 0-π fringe visibility of a Franson interferometer with delay ∆T is defined as
VFI(∆T ) =
PCFI(0)− PCFI(π)
PCFI(0) + PCFI(π)
= Re
(〈
e−i(ωˆS−ωˆI)∆T
〉)
= 〈cos[(ωˆS − ωˆI)∆T ]〉. (27)
The frequency-domain biphoton wave function associated with Eq. (21),
Ψ(ωS, ωI) =
e−ω
2
+σ
2
cor−ω
2
−
σ2coh√
π/2σcorσcoh
(28)
where ω+ ≡ (ωS + ωI)/2 and ω− = ωS − ωI , makes
〈cos[(ωˆS − ωˆI)∆T ]〉 = e−〈(ωˆS−ωˆI)
2〉∆T 2/2 (29)
≤ 1− 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉∆T 2/2 + 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉2∆T 4/8 (30)
= 1− 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉∆T 2/2 + 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)4〉∆T 4/24, (31)
with 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉 = 1/4σ2coh and the last equality following from Gaussian moment factoring [8]. In the presence of
eavesdropping we use a three-term Taylor-series expansion to show that
〈cos[(ωˆS − ωˆI)∆T ]〉 ≤ 1− 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)
2〉∆T 2
2
+
〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)4〉∆T 4
24
. (32)
Note that (32) does not assume the biphoton has a Gaussian wave function, so it applies for any biphoton state—pure
or mixed—of the signal and idler detected by Alice and Bob. The third term in this inequality satisfies
〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)4〉∆T 4/24 ≤ 〈(ω˜S − ω˜I)4〉∆T 4/24, (33)
where ω˜S and ω˜I are classical random variables obtained from frequency measurements at Alice and Bob’s terminals
respectively, i.e., by disabling the frequency-shifted arms in their conjugate Franson interferometers and relying on
those interferometers’ dispersive elements to make frequency information manifest in the observed arrival times [9].
Using (33) in (32) we get 〈
(ωˆS − ωˆI)2
〉 ≤ 2[1− VFI(∆T )]
∆T 2
+
〈(ω˜S − ω˜I)4〉∆T 2
12
. (34)
Together with 〈(∆ωˆS −∆ωˆI)2〉 ≤ 〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉, (34) completes the proof of Lemma 1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The coincidence probability for our conjugate Franson interferometer when only a single photon-pair has been
emitted by Alice’s source is [10]
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
∫
dω′S
2π
∫
dω′I
2π
〈[
Aˆ†S(ωS) + e
iφS Aˆ†S(ωS −∆Ω)
]
×
[
Aˆ†I(ωI) + e
iφI Aˆ†I(ωI −∆Ω)
] [
AˆS(ω
′
S) + e
−iφS AˆS(ω
′
S −∆Ω)
]
×
[
AˆI(ω
′
I) + e
−iφI AˆI(ω
′
I −∆Ω)
]〉
e−i[β2(ω
2
S−ω
2
I−ω
′2
S +ω
′2
I )/2−(ωS−ω
′
S)t+(ωI−ω
′
I)u]. (35)
Using Eq. (9), this expression becomes
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
∫
dω′S
2π
∫
dω′I
2π
〈[|ωS〉SS〈0|+ eiφS |ωS −∆Ω〉SS〈0|]
× [|ωI〉II〈0|+ eiφI |ωI −∆Ω〉II〈0|] [|0〉SS〈ω′S |+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈ω′S −∆Ω|]
× [|0〉II〈ω′I |+ e−iφI |0〉II〈ω′I −∆Ω|]〉 e−i[β2(ω2S−ω2I−ω′2S +ω′2I )/2−(ωS−ω′S)t+(ωI−ω′I )u]. (36)
9Multiplying out the bracketed expressions inside the averaging leads to a sum of sixteen terms, but only four of
them make nonzero contributions when ∆Ω > Tg/2β2 ≫ 3/σcoh. To show that this is so, we begin by rewriting
Eq. (36) in terms of the sum and difference variables t+ ≡ (t + u)/2, t− ≡ t− u, ω+ ≡ (ωS + ωI)/2, ω− ≡ ωS − ωI ,
ω′+ ≡ (ω′S + ω′I)/2, and ω′− ≡ ω′S − ω′I , obtaining
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dt+
∫ Tg/2
−Tg/2
dt−
∫
dω+
2π
∫
dω−
2π
∫
dω′+
2π
∫
dω′−
2π
〈[|ω+ + ω−/2〉SS〈0|
+ eiφS |ω+ + ω−/2−∆Ω〉SS〈0|
] [|ω+ − ω−/2〉II〈0|+ eiφI |ω+ − ω−/2−∆Ω〉II〈0|]
× [|0〉SS〈ω′+ + ω′−/2|+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈ω′+ + ω′−/2−∆Ω|]
× [|0〉II〈ω′+ − ω′−/2|+ e−iφI |0〉II〈ω′+ − ω′−/2−∆Ω|]〉
× e−i[β2(ω+ω−−ω′+ω′−)−(ω+−ω′+)t−−(ω−−ω′−)t+]. (37)
Next, we perform the t−, t+, and ω
′
− integrals and get
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dω+
2π
∫
dω−
2π
∫
dω′+
2π
〈[|ω+ + ω−/2〉SS〈0|+ eiφS |ω+ + ω−/2−∆Ω〉SS〈0|]
× [|ω+ − ω−/2〉II〈0|+ eiφI |ω+ − ω−/2−∆Ω〉I I〈0|]
× [|0〉SS〈ω′+ + ω−/2|+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈ω′+ + ω−/2−∆Ω|]
× [|0〉II〈ω′+ − ω−/2|+ e−iφI |0〉II〈ω′+ − ω−/2−∆Ω|]〉
× Tg
sin[(ω+ − ω′+)Tg/2]
(ω+ − ω′+)Tg/2
e−iβ2(ω+−ω
′
+)ω− . (38)
Because the phase-matching bandwidth BPM greatly exceeds 1/Tg, the state-average term in Eq. (38) is essentially
unchanged for ω ≡ (ω+ + ω′+)/2 excursions on the order of 10/Tg. Thus Eq. (38) simplifies to
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dω
2π
∫
dω−
2π
∫
dω′
2π
〈[|ω + ω−/2〉SS〈0|+ eiφS |ω + ω−/2−∆Ω〉SS〈0|]
× [|ω − ω−/2〉II〈0|+ eiφI |ω − ω−/2−∆Ω〉II〈0|]
× [|0〉SS〈ω + ω−/2|+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈ω + ω−/2−∆Ω|]
× [|0〉II〈ω − ω−/2|+ e−iφI |0〉II〈ω − ω−/2−∆Ω|]〉
× Tg sin(ω
′Tg/2)
ω′Tg/2
e−iβ2ω
′ω− , (39)
where ω′ ≡ ω+ − ω′+. Performing the ω′ integral then gives us
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dω
2π
∫ Tg/2β2
−Tg/2β2
dω−
2π
〈[|ω + ω−/2〉SS〈0|+ eiφS |ω + ω−/2−∆Ω〉SS〈0|]
× [|ω − ω−/2〉II〈0|+ eiφI |ω − ω−/2−∆Ω〉I I〈0|]
× [|0〉SS〈ω + ω−/2|+ e−iφS |0〉SS〈ω + ω−/2−∆Ω|]
× [|0〉II〈ω − ω−/2|+ e−iφI |0〉II〈ω − ω−/2−∆Ω|]〉 . (40)
At this point we can quickly eliminate twelve terms from Eq. (40). In Eve’s absence, any term containing
〈|ωA〉SS〈ωB| ⊗ |ω′A〉I 〈ω′B|〉 will only contribute if |ωA − ω′A| ≤ 3/σcoh and |ωB − ω′B| ≤ 3/σcoh. Indeed, the mag-
nitude of each of these noncontributor terms is at least exp(−∆Ω2σ2coh/2) times smaller than the terms we will
retain. For our paper’s system example, which assumes ∆Ω/2π = 5GHz, this attenuation factor is exp(−20) for
σcoh = 0.20 ns (corresponding to Tf = 16δT ) and exp(−82) for σcoh = 0.41 ns (corresponding to Tf = 32δT ). These
numbers apply to detectors without timing jitter. With timing jitter, the preceding attenuation factor becomes
exp(−∆Ω2β22 ln(2)/2δT 2), which equals exp(−8.98) for our ∆Ωβ2 =
√
2Tg, Tg = 108 ps , δT = 30 ps system example.
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It follows that the only terms which survive in PCCFI are as given below, where we have reverted to ωS , ωI notation,
PCCFI(φS , φI) =
η
16
∫
dωS
2π
∫ ωS+Tg/2β2
ωS−Tg/2β2
dωI
2π
〈[
|ωS〉S |ωI〉II〈ωI |S〈ωS |+ ei(φS+φI)|ωS −∆Ω〉S |ωI −∆Ω〉I I〈ωI |S〈ωS |
+ e−i(φS+φI)|ωS〉S |ωI〉I I〈ωI −∆Ω|S〈ωS −∆Ω|+ |ωS −∆Ω〉S |ωI −∆Ω〉II〈ωI −∆Ω|S〈ωS −∆Ω|
]〉
. (41)
The limits in the ωI integral can be extended to −∞ < ω− < ∞, if no eavesdropping has occurred, because ∆Ω >
Tg/2β2 ≫ 3/σcoh, in which case
PCCFI =
η
8
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
[
1 + Re
(
ei(φS+φI)〈|ωS −∆Ω〉S |ωI −∆Ω〉II〈ωI |S〈ωS |〉
)]
(42)
=
η
8
∫
dωS
2π
∫
dωI
2π
∫
dtS
∫
dtI
[
1 + Re
(
ei(φS+φI)〈|ωS −∆Ω〉S |ωI −∆Ω〉I I〈tI |S〈tS |〉ei(ωStS−ωItI)
)]
(43)
=
η
8
∫
dtS
∫
dtI
[
1 + Re
(
ei(φS+φI)ei(tS−tI )∆Ω〈|tS〉S |tI〉II〈tI |S〈tS |〉
)]
(44)
=
η
8
[
1 + Re
(
ei(φS+φI)
〈
ei(tˆS−tˆI)∆Ω
〉)]
. (45)
Now suppose that there is eavesdropping. Any intrusion by Eve that degrades the frequency correlations to the point
that the suppressed terms do contribute to PCCFI will be detected by the Franson interferometer and accounted for via
Lemma 1, so we will complete our Lemma 2 proof using Eq. (45). Because the coincidence probability only depends
on φ ≡ φS + φI , we shall use the notation PCCFI(φ) in what follows.
The conjugate-Franson interferometer’s 0-π fringe visibility is defined to be
VCFI(∆Ω) =
PCCFI(0)− PCCFI(π)
PCCFI(0) + PCCFI(π)
= Re
(〈
ei(tˆS−tˆI )∆Ω
〉)
= 〈cos[(tˆS − tˆI)∆Ω]〉. (46)
The time-domain biphoton wave function, Eq. (21), makes
〈cos[(tˆS − tˆI)∆Ω]〉 = e−〈(tˆS−tˆI )
2〉∆Ω2/2 (47)
≤ 1− 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉∆Ω2/2 + 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉2∆Ω4/8 (48)
= 1− 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉∆Ω2/2 + 〈(tˆS − tˆI)4〉∆Ω4/24, (49)
with 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉 = σ2cor and the last equality again following from Gaussian moment factoring. In the presence of
eavesdropping we use a three-term Taylor-series expansion to show that
〈cos[(tˆS − tˆI)∆Ω]〉 ≤ 1− 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉∆Ω2/2 + 〈(tˆS − tˆI)4〉∆Ω4/24. (50)
As noted in Lemma 1, (50) does not assume the biphoton has a Gaussian wave function, so it applies for any biphoton
state—pure or mixed—of the signal and idler detected by Alice and Bob. The third term in this inequality satisfies
〈(tˆS − tˆI)4〉∆Ω4/24 ≤ 〈(t˜S − t˜I)4〉∆Ω4/24, (51)
where t˜S and t˜I are classical random variables obtained from arrival-time measurements at Alice and Bob’s terminals
respectively, i.e., by disabling the long arms in their Franson interferometer’s [11]. Using (51) in (50) we get〈
(tˆS − tˆI)2
〉 ≤ 2[1− VCFI(∆Ω)]
∆Ω2
+
〈(t˜S − t˜I)4〉∆Ω2
12
. (52)
Together with 〈(∆tˆS −∆tˆI)2〉 ≤ 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉, (52) completes the proof of Lemma 2.
SECURITY CALCULATIONS
The time-frequency covariance matrix
The TFCM for the biphoton state from Eq. (21) is
Γ0 =
[
γ0SS γ
0
SI
γ0IS γ
0
II
]
, (53)
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where
γ0SS = γ
0
II =
[
σ2cor/4 + σ
2
coh 0
0 1/4σ2cor + 1/16σ
2
coh
]
(54a)
γ0SI = γ
0
IS =
[ −σ2cor/4 + σ2coh 0
0 1/4σ2cor − 1/16σ2coh
]
. (54b)
The root-mean-square two-photon correlation time is given by σcor =
√
2 ln(2)/(2πBPM) in terms of the FWHM
phase-matching bandwidth (in Hz). The root-mean-square two-photon pulse duration is given by σcoh = Tf/
√
8 ln(2)
in terms of our protocol’s frame duration—which is taken to be the FWHM coherence time—and is set by choice of
the pump pulse’s duration. To achieve multiple secure bits per coincidence, we require σcoh ≫ δT/
√
8 ln(2) ≫ σcor.
Under this condition, we have 〈∆tˆ2S0〉 = 〈∆tˆ2I0〉 = σ2coh, 〈(∆tˆS0 − ∆tˆI0)2〉 = σ2cor, 〈∆ωˆ2S0〉 = 〈∆ωˆ2I0〉 = 1/4σ2cor, and〈(∆ωˆS0−∆ωˆI0)2〉 = 1/4σ2coh, where the subscript 0 denotes the initial state produced by the source. The Franson and
conjugate-Franson interferometer’s allow us to upper bound the variances of Alice and Bob’s arrival-time and frequency
differences, which we denote 〈(∆tˆS−∆tˆI)2〉 = (1+ξt)〈(∆tˆS0−∆tˆI0)2〉 and 〈(∆ωˆS−∆ωˆI)2〉 = (1+ξω)〈(∆ωˆS0−∆ωˆI0)2〉,
where ξt and ξω quantify the amount of excess noise.
In an operational system, ξω and ξt will be bounded from the measured Franson and conjugate-Franson’s 0-
π visibilities, plus the fourth moments of the arrival-time and frequency differences obtained, respectively, from
Franson and conjugate-Franson count records with one arm disabled at Alice and Bob’s terminals. For the theoretical
assessment of the secure-key rate presented in the paper, we used assumed values for the 0-π visibilities and the
following jitter-limited values for the fourth moments appearing in Lemmas 1 and 2:
〈(ω˜S − ω˜I)4〉 = 3(δT/2
√
ln(2)β2)
4, (55)
and
〈(t˜S − t˜I)4〉 = 3(δT/2
√
ln(2))4. (56)
Here, we have assumed that our detectors have statistically independent, identically distributed Gaussian timing
jitters whose FWHM δT satisfies δT 2 ≫ β22〈(ωˆS − ωˆI)2〉 and δT 2 ≫ 〈(tˆS − tˆI)2〉.
Off-diagonal elements in covariance sub-matrices
The off-diagonal elements in Eq. (54) are all zero, because Alice’s source does not produce any time-frequency cross
correlations. However, Eve’s intrusion could result in a TFCM
Γ =
[
γSS γSI
γIS γII
]
, (57)
whose sub-matrices have nonzero off-diagonal elements. Inasmuch as the Franson and conjugate-Franson interferome-
ters do not probe those off-diagonal elements, we now prove that the information they do provide—through Lemmas 1
and 2—suffices to upper bound Eve’s Holevo information.
We begin by introducing dimensionless time and frequency operators defined as follows
ˆ˜tJ =
tˆJ
T
(58a)
ˆ˜ωJ = ωˆJT, (58b)
for J = S, I, where T ≡ √2σcohσcor is a normalization time that symmetrizes these conjugate observables, i.e., for
Alice’s SPDC source we have that 〈∆ˆ˜t2J0〉 = 〈∆ˆ˜ω2J0〉. The biphoton wave function from Eq. (21) now becomes a
two-mode squeezed-vacuum state of the modes associated with the effective annihilation and creation operators
ˆ˜aJ = (
ˆ˜tJ − iǫJ ˆ˜ωJ)/
√
2 (59a)
ˆ˜a†J = (
ˆ˜tJ + iǫJ ˆ˜ωJ)/
√
2, (59b)
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because [ˆ˜ωJ ,
ˆ˜tK ] = iǫJδJK implies that [ˆ˜aJ , ˆ˜a
†
K ] = δJK . As a result, we can now apply security results of entanglement-
based CVQKD to our TEE-based HDQKD protocol.
Eve’s arbitrary Gaussian attack can be decomposed into the following two steps: Step 1, she interacts her ancillary
state with the idler beam—while it is en route from Alice to Bob—in a manner that does not introduce any time-
frequency off-diagonal elements in Alice and Bob’s TFCM. Step 2, she applies individual symplectic transformations
to the idler state and her ancillary state, a process which creates such time-frequency off-diagonal elements [12].
Step 2 consists of a rotation followed by quadrature squeezing. Because it only involves local unitary operations, it
does not affect Eve’s Holevo information. Eve’s goal here is to minimize δω˜2 ≡ 〈(ˆ˜ωS− ˆ˜ωI)2〉, and thus maximize Alice
and Bob’s 0-π Franson-interferometer visibility so that they will underestimate the information her interaction has
yielded [13]. More specifically, Eve’s goal in Step 2 is to make δω˜2 smaller than δω˜2diag, the 〈(ˆ˜ωS − ˆ˜ωI)2〉 value when
she only employs Step 1, i.e., when Alice and Bob’s TFCM has no off-diagonal terms representing time-frequency
cross correlations.
To see that Eve’s effort in this regard is futile we proceed as follows, where, for notational simplicity, we have
assumed that mean values have been subtracted out. Let the effective idler annihilation operator after Step 1 be
ˆ˜
b.
The effective idler annihilation operator after Step 2 is then
ˆ˜aI = e
iϕ cosh(r)ˆ˜b − ei(θ−ϕ) sinh(r)ˆ˜b†, (60)
where ϕ is the phase used in the rotation, r is the squeezing parameter, and θ is the phase used in the squeezing
operation. We now find that
ˆ˜ωI = [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] ˆ˜ωb + [sin(ϕ) cosh(r)− sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] ˆ˜tb, (61)
from which the mean-squared frequency error is seen to obey
δω˜2 = 〈 ˆ˜ω2S〉 − 2 [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] 〈 ˆ˜ωS ˆ˜ωb〉
+ [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)]2 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉+ [sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)]2 〈ˆ˜t2b〉, (62)
where we have used the fact that Eve’s Step 1 does not create any time-frequency cross correlations. Setting ϕ = 0,
r = 0, and θ = 0 in this expression eliminates Eve’s Step 2 and leads us to the benchmark value
δω˜2diag = 〈(ˆ˜ωS − ˆ˜ωb)2〉, (63)
that she is trying to beat with her symplectic transformation. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
δω˜2diag ≪ 〈 ˆ˜ω2S〉, because violating this condition makes Eve’s presence extremely obvious to Alice and Bob.
To minimize δω˜2, we set its partial derivatives with respect to ϕ, r, and θ to zero. For the partial derivative with
respect to ϕ we have
∂(δω˜2)
∂ϕ
= 2 [sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] 〈 ˆ˜ωS ˆ˜ωb〉
− 2 [sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] (〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 − 〈ˆ˜t2b〉), (64)
which vanishes if
[sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] = 0 (C.1)
or
〈 ˆ˜ωS ˆ˜ωb〉 = [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] (〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 − 〈ˆ˜t2b〉). (C.2)
Condition (C.1), combined with the fact that Eve’s Step 1 does not create any time-frequency cross correlations,
implies that the TFCM will not have any time-frequency off-diagonal terms. Hence we will only carry forward
Condition (C.2) in trying to see if Eve’s Step 2 helps her.
For the partial derivative with respect to θ we have
∂(δω˜2)
∂θ
= 2 sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)〈 ˆ˜ωS ˆ˜ωb〉 − 2 [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] [sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉
− 2 [sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)〈ˆ˜t2b 〉. (65)
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If the ϕ partial derivative vanishes because (C.2) is satisfied, we need
sin(θ) = 0 (C.2.1)
or
r = 0 (C.2.2)
to make the θ partial derivative vanish.
For the partial derivative with respect to r we have
∂(δω˜2)
∂r
= −2 [cos(ϕ) sinh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) cosh(r)] 〈 ˆ˜ωS ˆ˜ωb〉
+ 2 [cos(ϕ) cosh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] [cos(ϕ) sinh(r) + cos(θ − ϕ) cosh(r)] 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉
+ 2 [sin(ϕ) cosh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) sinh(r)] [sin(ϕ) sinh(r) − sin(θ − ϕ) cosh(r)] 〈ˆ˜t2b〉. (66)
If the ϕ and θ partial derivatives vanish because Conditions (C.2) and (C.2.1) are satisfied, then the r partial derivative
equals zero when sinh(r) = ± cosh(r), where the plus sign applies for cos(θ) = −1 and the minus sign for cos(θ) = 1.
We then find that δω˜2 = 〈 ˆ˜ω2S〉 ≫ δω˜2diag, making Eve’s presence very detectable if she elects to perform Step 2 with
these parameter values.
At this point, the only remaining case that might provide Eve some utility from her Step 2 is when Conditions (C.2)
and (C.2.2) are satisfied and the r partial derivative vanishes. Here, Step 2 corresponds to rotation without squeezing,
in which case we need cos(θ) = 0 to make the r partial derivative vanish, yielding
δω˜2 = 〈 ˆ˜ω2S〉 − cos2(ϕ)(〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 − 〈ˆ˜t2b〉) + 〈ˆ˜t2b〉. (67)
If 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 = 〈ˆ˜t2b〉, we get δω˜2 ≫ δω˜2diag, so Eve shouldn’t use a symplectic transformation after her Step 1. If 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 > 〈ˆ˜t2b〉,
then her δω˜2 is minimized by choosing cos2(ϕ) = 1, and Eq. (61) shows that no off-diagonal TFCM elements arise
from time-frequency cross correlations. If 〈 ˆ˜ω2b 〉 < 〈ˆ˜t2b〉, then Eve’s δω˜2 is minimized by choosing cos(ϕ) = 0, and we get
δω˜2 = 〈 ˆ˜ω2S〉+ 〈ˆ˜t2b〉 ≫ δω˜2diag, making her presence very detectable if she elects to perform Step 2 with these parameter
values.
To summarize, we have shown that for any value of Eve’s Holevo information, the minimum value of δω˜2 can be
achieved without introducing any off-diagonal elements into the TFCM sub-matrices [13]. Hence Lemmas 1 and 2
suffice to bound the information that Eve obtains from an optimized collective attack.
Alice and Bob’s Shannon Information
Alice and Bob postselect frames in which each of them had at least one detection, which may be either a photon
detection or a dark count. A fraction q of these postselected frames are reconciled to generate key, while the rest
are used for the Franson and conjugate-Franson measurements needed to estimate ξt and ξω and the decoy-state
measurements needed for parameter estimation. The probability for Alice and Bob to postselect a frame is therefore
pr =
∞∑
n=0
ps(n) [1− (1− ηA)n(1− pd)] [1− (1− ηBηP )n(1 − pd)] , (68)
where: ps(n) = µ
ne−µ/n! gives the probability that Alice’s source emits an n-pair state in terms of the average number,
µ, of pairs emitted per frame [14]; ηA and ηB are Alice and Bob’s detection efficiencies; ηP is the transmissivity of the
fiber-propagation link from Alice’s source to Bob’ terminal; and pd is the probability of one dark-count occurring in a
frame. Note that we are neglecting the possibility of multiple dark counts occurring in a frame, because the product
of the frame duration and the dark-count rate (for typical SNSPDs) is much smaller than one.
When either Alice or Bob register more than one detection in a frame, they discard those data and randomly
choose an arrival time from a Gaussian distribution whose variance equals their terminal’s TFCM entry for arrival
time plus the timing-jitter variance [15]. It follows that there are five possibilities for Alice and Bob’s joint arrival-time
distribution, from which their Shannon information can be found.
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1. Their arrival times are jointly Gaussian random variables with a covariance matrix that is a submatrix of the
TFCM augmented to account for their detectors’ timing jitters. This case is a postselected frame in which
Alice’s source emitted one photon-pair and neither Alice nor Bob had a dark count.
2. Their arrival times are independent Gaussian random variables with variances equal to the values from the
TFCM plus the variance of their detectors’ timing jitters. This case is a postselected frame in which one of two
situations occurred: (1) Alice’s source emitted multiple photon-pairs and both Alice and Bob registered at least
one photon detection; or (2) Alice’s source emitted one photon-pair and both Alice and Bob registered photon
detections with at least one of them also having a dark count. (Strictly speaking, there could be some correlation
between Alice and Bob’s arrival times in this case. By neglecting such a possibility, we are underestimating its
contribution to their Shannon information.)
3. Alice’s arrival time is a Gaussian random variable with variance equal to the value from the TFCM plus the
variance of her detector’s timing jitter, and Bob’s is uniformly distributed over the frame. This case is a
postselected frame in which Alice registered at least one photon detection and Bob had a dark count without a
photon detection.
4. Alice’s arrival time is uniformly distributed over the frame, and Bob’s is a Gaussian random variable with
variance equal to the value from the TFCM plus the variance of his detector’s timing jitter. This case is a
postselected frame in which Alice had a dark count without a photon detection and Bob registered at least one
photon detection.
5. Both Alice’s and Bob’s arrival times are uniformly distributed over the frame. This case is a postselected frame
in which Alice and Bob both had dark counts and neither had a photon detection.
Given that a particular frame has been postselected, the conditional occurrence probabilities for the preceding five
events are
P1 = ps(1)ηAηBηP (1 − pd)2/pr (69a)
P2 =
∞∑
n=2
ps(n) [1− (1 − ηA)n] [1− (1 − ηBηP )n] /pr + ps(1)ηAηBηP (2pd − p2d)/pr (69b)
P3 =
∞∑
n=1
ps(n) [1− (1 − ηA)n] [pd(1− ηBηP )n] /pr (69c)
P4 =
∞∑
n=1
ps(n) [pd(1− ηA)n] [1− (1− ηBηP )n] /pr (69d)
P5 =
∞∑
n=0
ps(n)p
2
d(1− ηA)n(1− ηBηP )n/pr. (69e)
Alice and Bob’s Shannon information is given by
I(A;B) =
∫
dtAdtB pTA,TB (tA, tB) log2
(
pTA,TB (tA, tB)
pTA(tA)pTB (tB)
)
, (70)
for which we need the joint probability density function, pTA,TB (tA, tB), for their measured arrival times, TA and TB,
from which the marginal densities, pTA(tA) and pTB (tB), are easily obtained. The mean values of TA and TB are
invariant to which of the preceding five postselection events has occurred. Thus they do not affect Alice and Bob’s
Shannon information, and so we will set them to zero.
The joint density function we need can be found from
pTA,TB (tA, tB) =
5∑
i=1
Pi pTA,TB |i( tA, tB | i ), (71)
where pTA,TB |i( tA, tB | i ) is the joint probability density for TA and TB given that event i has occurred. The condi-
tional probability densities for events 2 through 5 are easily found, because TA and TB are statistically independent
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given that one of these events has occurred. We have that
pTA,TB |2( tA, tB | 2 ) = pG(tA;σ2A) pG(tB;σ2B) (72a)
pTA,TB |3( tA, tB | 3 ) = pG(tA;σ2A) pU (tB;Tf ) (72b)
pTA,TB |4( tA, tB | 4 ) = pU (tA;Tf) pG(tB;σ2B) (72c)
pTA,TB |2( tA, tB | 5 ) = pU (tA;Tf) pU (tB;Tf), (72d)
where pG(t;σ
2) is a Gaussian probability density with zero mean and variance σ2, pU (t;Tf ) is a uniform probability
density over the interval of [−Tf/2, Tf/2], and
σ2A = 〈∆tˆ2S〉+ (δT/2.35)2 (73a)
σ2B = 〈∆tˆ2I〉+ (δT/2.35)2. (73b)
When event 1 has occurred, TA and TB are jointly-Gaussian random variables with zero means and covariance matrix
Λ =
[
σ2A 〈∆tˆS∆tˆI〉
〈∆tˆS∆tˆI〉 σ2B
]
. (74)
Eve’s Holevo information
Here we describe how Lemmas 1 and 2 permit us to place an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information. Alice and
Bob’s TFCM has the form given in Eq. (57), with
γSS = γ
0
SS (75a)
γSI = γIS =
[
1− ηt 0
0 1− ηω
]
γ0SI (75b)
γII =
[
1 + ǫt 0
0 1 + ǫω
]
γ0II , (75c)
where {ηt, ηω} quantifies signal-idler correlation loss, and {ǫt, ǫω} quantifies idler excess noise. By means of Lemmas 1
and 2, the Franson and conjugate-Franson measurements provide upper bounds on the mean-squared arrival-time and
frequency differences giving us values for the the excess-noise factors ξt and ξω. These values do not, however,
determine {ηt, ηω} and {ǫt, ǫω}. Nevertheless, knowing ξt and ξω , restricts the set,M, of physically-allowed TFCMs.
Our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information is the maximum of her Holevo information over the TFCMs in M.
For a given a TFCM a Gaussian attack maximizes Eve’s Holevo information. Thus, we can assume that the Alice,
Bob, and Eve share a pure Gaussian state in evaluating that Holevo information. We have that her Holevo information
for covariance matrix Γ is
χΓ(A;E) = S(ρˆE)−
∫
dt pTA(tA)S(ρˆE|TA=tA), (76)
where S(ρˆ) = −Tr[ρˆ log2(ρˆ)] is the von Neumann entropy of the state ρˆ. Because Alice, Bob, and Eve’s joint quantum
state is pure, we have S(ρˆE) = S(ρˆAB). Conditioned on Alice’s measurement, the quantum state shared by Bob and
Eve is also pure, so that S(ρˆE|TA=tA) = S(ρˆB|TA=tA). Furthermore, because all these states are Gaussian, the von
Neumann entropy of Bob and Eve’s conditional quantum state is independent of Alice’s measurement result. Thus,
we can drop the integral in Eq. (76) and get
χΓ(A;E) = S(ρˆAB)− S(ρˆB|TA). (77)
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To evaluate χΓ(A;E) from Eq. (77), we define
I1 = 〈∆tˆ2S〉〈∆ωˆ2S〉 (78a)
I2 = 〈∆tˆ2I〉〈∆ωˆ2I 〉 (78b)
I3 = 〈∆tˆS∆tˆI〉〈∆ωˆS∆ωˆI〉 (78c)
I4 = (〈∆tˆ2S〉〈∆tˆ2I〉 − 〈∆tˆS∆tˆI〉2)(〈∆ωˆ2S〉〈∆ωˆ2I 〉 − 〈∆ωˆS∆ωˆI〉2) (78d)
d± =
1√
2
√
I1 + I2 + 2I3 ±
√
(I1 + I2 + 2I3)2 − 4I4. (78e)
We then have that S(ρˆAB) = f(d+) + f(d−), where
f(d) = (d+ 1/2) log2(d+ 1/2)− (d− 1/2) log2(d− 1/2). (79)
and
S(ρB|t) = f
(√
det[γI|TA ]
)
, (80)
where Bob’s conditional covariance matrix is
γI|TA =
[ 〈∆tˆ2I〉 − 〈∆tˆS∆tˆI〉2/〈∆tˆ2S〉 0
0 〈∆ωˆ2I 〉
]
. (81)
Our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information is now found from
χUBξt,ξω(A;E) = sup
Γ∈M
{χΓ(A;E)}. (82)
Secure-key rate
For a postselected frame that originated from emission of one photon-pair, Eve’s Holevo information about Alice’s
measurement result is at most χUBξt,ξω(A;E). For a postselected frame that originated from emission of multiple photon-
pairs, we grant Eve perfect information about Alice’s measurement result. The fraction of the postselected frames
that originated from emission of one photon-pair is
F = ps(1) [1− (1 − ηA)(1− pd)] [1− (1− ηBηP )(1 − pd)] /pr. (83)
The error-correcting code used during reconciliation to establish nR shared random bits between Alice and Bob
employs, on average, nECC syndrome bits, where
nR = βI(A;B) + nECC, (84)
with 0 < β ≤ 1 being the code’s reconciliation efficiency [16]. In total, therefore, Eve will have captured at most
(1 − F )nR + nECC + FχUBξt,ξω(A;E) bits of information per postselected frame. The secure-key rate, in bits per
postselected frame, is the difference between nR and Eve’s total information, hence it satisfies
∆I(A;B) ≥ βI(A;B) − (1− F )nR − FχUBξt,ξω (A;E). (85)
When all postselected frames originated from emissions of one photon-pair, i.e., F = 1, we recover CVQKD’s secure-
key rate bound, ∆I(A;B) ≥ βI(A;B)−χUBξt,ξω(A;E), showing that, as expected, the emission of multiple photon-pairs
reduces the secure-key rate of time-energy entanglement based HDQKD. The secure-key rate in bits per second for our
time-energy entanglement based HDQKD protocol is the product of the frame postselection rate and the secure-key
rate in bits per postselected frame, viz.,
SKR ≥ qpr
3Tf
[
βI(A;B) − (1− F )nR − FχUBξt,ξω(A;E)
]
, (86)
where we have accounted for frames occurring once every 3Tf seconds.
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